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PREFACE 
This study is primarily based on a survey of more than one thousand 
informal lenders operating in different parts of the country. These lenders were 
selected on the basis of information collected through a household census 
conducted in 250 villages randomly selected from four provinces of the country 
and from Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The study was completed with the 
financial assistance provided by the State Bank of Pakistan and the World Bank. 
This study was jointly undertaken by three research organisations of the 
country: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad. 
Applied Economics Research Centre (AERC). Karachi and Punjab Economic 
Research Institute (PERI). Lahore. In addition to preparing this study, the PIDE 
team developed the questionnaire for informal lenders and trained field 
interviewers. AERC and PERI took the responsibility of data collection and iis 
partial processing. PERI's activities were limited to Punjab province and Azad 
Jammu and Kashmir, while the rest of the three provinces of the country, Sindh, 
the NWFP. and Balochistan, were covered by the AERC. 
During the process of data collection and data analysis, certain inherent 
limitations of the questionnaire approach became evident. Four case studies 
were carried out in four small towns of Punjab province to enrich the analyses in 
understanding the mechanism of rural credit market, 
We are grateful to Dr Sarfraz Khan Qureshi, Director, PIDE, for his 
valuable guidance and encouragement. We also owe our thanks to Masood 
Ashfaque, Nabeela Arshad, Jafar Hussain, Anis Haider Hamdani, and Ali Shan 
Ahmed for their excellent assistance at all stages of data processing and data 
analysis. We are especially thankful to Dr Faiz Bilquees, Chief of Research, 
PIDE. for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this study and for editorial 
assistance. Finally, our thanks also to Noor Ahmed for providing us excellent 
typing assistance and preparing several drafts of this study before it could he 
published. 
M. Irfan 
G. M. Arif 
Syed Mubashir Ali 
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INTRODUCTION 
Heterogeneity of practices and complexity of operations obtained in the 
informal ercdit system defy efforts to encapsulate and comprehend its functioning. 
Conventional reductionism identifying moneylender as the typical informal lender 
in fact scratches the lip of the iceberg. Credit transactions in the informal market are 
enmeshed with the web of business matrix in wholesale and retail trade of the 
country. In the chronological order informal credit system being rooted in history 
and culture pre-existed the modern banking system—the so-called formal sector. 
Variety of agents having different titles such as arhtis, input dealers, commission 
agents, landlord and moneylenders are some of the major operator in the field of 
informal credit. 
It is imperative to understand the complex operations taking place in the 
informal credit market. Not only does the informal network help the poor and 
needy to tide over difficult limes but also constitutes a predominant source of credit 
in the country in particular for the rural areas. It is because of these important roles 
performed by the informal credit market which make it highly relevant subject to 
examine in depth for macro and sectoral policy formulation. 
Both as an ingredient of economic development and specific thrust of the 
governments in the developing countries like Pakistan formal credit system 
expanded substantially over the years. In Pakistan, considerable resources have 
been devoted to set-up many institutions with particular focus on the objective of 
providing credit to farmers at interest rates lower than charged by informal sources. 
Notwithstanding the massive expansion in the institutional n e t w o r k -
Agricultural Development Bank (ADBP) Commercial Banks and Co-operative 
Societies, the informal sector still accounts for overwhelming share of credit 
extended to rural population, in particular to farmers. In a recent survey of rural 
households, conducted by the Applied Economics Research Centre (AHRC) and 
Punjab Economic Research Institute (PERI) in 1996, informal credit accounted for 
y /78 percent of the borrowings made by the households. An inter-temporal 
comparison based on various surveys (Appendix Table A l ) is suggestive of a 
decline in the share of informal sector in total borrowings of rural households 
during the 1973-85 period. Since 1985 the trend appears to have been reversed. 
This overtime comparison is however marred by varying sample sizes and different 
definitions used in various surveys. 
Dependency of small farm households (5 acres or less) on non-institutional 
sources seems to be even greater. According to the 1990 Agriculture Census, about 
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95 percent of outstanding debts obtained by these households were from non-
institutional sources. In case of tenant households this proportion further increased 
to over 95 percent. Not only does this suggest the predominance of the informal 
credit system but also possibly a rise in its share over the years, particularly in the 
case of small farmers. In other words, escalation in the credit demand owing to 
rising input costs and consumption liberalisation over the years outstripped the 
expanded credit provisions of formal sector institutions. 
The dominance of informal credit has been attributed to various factors. 
Because of geographic proximity of the lending sources, borrowers usually have 
low transaction costs if they resort to informal sources. No extensive legal 
procedures are involved and hardly any collateral is required in the non-institutional 
sector, while the lag between loan agreement and loan disbursement is minimal. 
Formal sources, on the other hand, are usually located in towns and because of the 
complex procedures, delayed disbursement, and requirements of collateral, small 
farmers and poor people cannot avail the opportunity to borrow. 
The working of informal financial markets in Pakistan has long been a 
subject of interest to researchers such as Qureshi et al. (1984); Malik (1989, 1990, 
1992); Alcem (1990); Qureshi and Shah (1992). However, an examination of the 
relevant literature reveals that research exercises mostly focussed on the demand 
side of the lending operation i.e., the credit demand of the households. The supply 
side, the generation of loanable funds, has largely been ignored. Alcem (1990) 
though collected information on the lending practices of informal lenders, but his 
findings had three main limitations. First, these findings cannot be generalised 
because they were based on only one semi-urban setting in Sindh. Informal credit 
market in Pakistan like other developing countries exhibits a good deal of 
heterogeneity and the structure and operations vary from region to region. Second, 
the study ignored the credit functions of the processing units, such as cotton ginning 
factories and sugar mills, which play a role in supplying inputs on crcdit to farmers 
and also provide funds to other informal lenders. Third, the study did not explore 
the sources of funds of the informal lenders. 
The nature and the issues related to operation of the informal credit market 
and its linkages with the formal system cannot be fully understood unless the 
supply side of the lending operations is examined. The present study aims to bridge 
this gap by extensively examining the operation of informal rural credit market 
utilising the data collected through informal lender survey and case studies. The 
specific objectives of the study arc: 
• To describe the structure of informal credit market. 
• To examine the sources and costs of funds generated by informal lenders. 
• To determine the transaction costs of lending. 
• To understand the mechanism entailing the credit extension and recovery 
of loans. 
• To quantify the interest charged by the informal lenders on the loans. 
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Data sources of this study and their limitations are discussed in Chapter I of 
this report. The description of the structure of informal credit market by type of 
lenders, their geographical concentration and the sources of funds are contained in 
Chapter 2. Procedures adopted in credit extension, volume of credit and its 
variation and recovery of loans constitute the subject matter of Chapter 3. Summary 
of the findings is provided in final chapter. Appendix A comprises of statistical 
tables. Demographic and socio-economic characteristics of informal lenders and the 
detailed discussion of case studies are presented in Appendices B and C. 
Chapter 1 
DATA SOURCES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
1.1. The Survey of Informal Lenders—Sample Size and Coverage 
The survey of 1018 informal lenders conducted in May-June 1996 is the 
main source of data for the present study. The selection of these lenders was based 
on information gathered through a household census conducted by AERC and 
PERI in 250 randomly selected villages from four provinces of the country and in 
A/ad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK).1 During the conduct of census, respondents were 
asked to report the sources or credit irrespective of the fact whether they borrowed 
or not. Distribution of the responses of those households, which reported the 
sources of credit given in Table 1.1, indicates that shopkeepers and landlords were 
the most important source of credit for rural households. Moneylenders, 
commission agents, and input dealers were also identilied as sources of credit by 
the households. 
Table I. I 
Distribution of Household Responses by Sources of Credit 
(Percent) 
Sources of Credit Punjab/AJK Other Provinces 
Moneylenders 
Shopkeepers 
Landlords 
Commission Agents 
Village Bcoparis/Sub-agents 
Input Suppliers 
P r o c e s s i n g Uni t 
Others 
Total 100.0 
Sample Si/.e (N) (4812) 
2.2 
39.8 
8.3 
18.5 
2.8 
8.7 
0.9 
18.8 
100.0 
(6083) 
7.4 
19.2 
49.8 
12.1 
1.4 
1.8 
2.4 
6.1 
Soiin c Computed from ihe household census data. 
Note Ii is likely that households reported more than one source of credit. 
'A list of these villages is available with the authors. 
PERI and AERC. which were responsible for sample designing and data 
collection, used the household census data to draw samples for the survey of 
informal lenders in Punjab/AJK and "other provinces".* However, the procedure 
adopted by these two organisations to select informal lenders was not uniform. By 
using the census data. PERI lirst prepared a list of informal lenders operating in 
Punjab/AJK. From this list, a sample of 599 lenders was drawn. In the final 
selection of different types of informal lenders, certain adjustments in their relative 
proportions, as yielded by the household census, were made. The proportion of 
shopkeepers among the identified lenders was quite large in Punjab/AJK (Tabic 
1.1). But. in terms of volume of credit transactions, their share was likely to be 
small because shopkeepers usually did not deal with large amounts of credit. The 
proportion of shopkeepers in the sample selection was, therefore, adjusted 
downward. In view of the importance of commission agents and input dealers in 
the provision of credits to farmers, an upward adjustment was made to increase 
their representation in the sample. 
In the household census questionnaire, farm machinery suppliers and 
livestock/poultry feed dealers were not distinguished as separate categories of 
informal lenders. It was assumed that these lenders were recorded under the 
"others' category in the census questionnaire. Alter examining various documents 
including the 1985 Farm Machinery census, the share of farm machinery suppliers 
and livestock/poultry feed dealers in the Punjab/AJK sample was assumed lo be 13 
and 5 percent, respectively. On the basis of these proportions a sample was drawn 
by PERI. Finally each interviewer was given a list of lenders to be interviewed in 
the assigned area of Punjab and AJK. 
The procedure adopted by the AERC to selccl 419 lenders in Sindh, NWFP 
and Balochistan was different from the procedure outlined above. While AERC 
adjusted the household ccnsus data for assigning weights to different types of 
lenders, it left at the discretion of enumerators to select the respondents. The 
proportion of landlords among informal lenders yielded by Household Census (.lata 
was quite large in Sindh. However, their credit transactions were likely to be 
confined to their tenants only. It was deemed appropriate to make some downward 
adjustments: in the representation of landlords. Also an upward adjustment was 
made lo increase the proportion of commission agents and input dealers. The share 
of farm machinery suppliers and livestock/poultry feed dealers in the sample was 
regarded to be 12 and 8 percent respectively an adjustment partly based on the 
information available in the 1985 Farm Machinery Census. 
Since the AERC did not prepare any list of lenders identified during the 
household census, the enumerators were sent to those areas, where household 
census was carried out previously, to conduct the required number of interviews 
"The category "other Provinces" includes .Sindh. NWFP, and Balochistan. 
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with informal lenders. Il was the responsibility of interviewers to find out different 
types of lenders. The possibility that many lenders who were interviewed in Sindh, 
NWFP and Balochistan were not identified during the household census cannot be 
ruled out. 
Distribution of the 1018 informal lenders covered in the actual survey by 
their types by province is given in Table 1.2. Commission agents, input dealers, 
landlords, shopkeepers and farm machinery suppliers constituted more than 80 
percent of the total sample. The proportion of moneylenders in the total sample was 
less than 4 percent. Low coverage of the moneylenders has been mostly due to 
difficulties in getting information as discussed in the following pages. 
Admittedly the present study is hardly based on a representative sample of 
informal lenders operating in the country. The sample of informal lenders was 
partly based on the household census data pertaining to sources of credit. The 
information provided by the households about informal sources of credit may not 
be representative of the borrowing households because the information on sources 
of credit was gathered from all households irrespective of their participation in 
credit transactions. Furthermore, in Pakistan non-institutional lenders were mainly 
concentrated in small towns, excepting possibly the landlords, farm machinery 
suppliers, and shopkeepers who operate in rural areas. The concentration of lenders 
in urban/semi urban areas could not be reckoned while selecting the sample. In 
addition, the two organisations, PERI and AERC, which were responsible for 
sample designing and data collection in different regions, did not adopt uniform 
procedures to draw the sample of the informal lenders. Despite these shortcomings, 
however, the survey of informal lenders was a pioneering attempt in the country 
and it has generated useful data to assess the structure of non-institutional credit 
market in (he country. 
Table 1.2 
Distribution of Informal Lenders Covered in the Survey 
Type of Lenders Pakistan Punjab/ AJK Sindh 
NWFP/ 
Balochistan 
Commission Agents/Input Dealers 220 162 39 19 
Input Dealers 112 60 28 24 
Landlords 234 107 96 31 
Farm Machinery Holders 130 78 34 18 
Moneylenders 35 26 - 9 
Processing Unit 24 11 11 2 
Shopkeepers 149 79 56 14 
Livestock/Poultry 
Feed Dealers 67 32 29 6 
Others 48 44 4 3 
Total 1018 599 293 126 
Sonn e The 1996 Survey of Informal Lenders. 
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1.2. The Questionnaire 
A questionnaire was designed keeping in view the objectives of the study. 
The questionnaire had ten major sections: characteristics of informal lenders; 
procurement of inputs and their sales during 1995-96; quantity of outputs purchased 
by informal lenders; purpose of loan by types of borrowers; services provided to 
borrowers by lenders; nature of loans; recovery of loans and its mechanism; sources 
of funds for lending operation; costs incurred on transaction; and methods used by 
informal lenders to select the borrowers (the questionnaire is available with (he 
authors). Interviewers and supervisors of field survey were imparted comprehensive 
training, involving pilot testing of questionnaire that facilitated improvement of 
questionnaire as well as sharpened the comprehension of enumerators. 
However, it would be unrealistic to cl aim that the questionnaire was 
flawless. It had certain limitations. For example, the possibility that lending was not 
the only business activity of several informal lenders could not be reflected in the 
design of the questionnaire wherein provision for collecting information on 
activities of lenders was not made. This was because inclusion of questions on other 
activities would have increased considerably its length thereby affecting the quality 
of response. Similarly, business activities of informal lenders differed widely but 
the questionnaire was not designed to reckon with these variations. Had the 
questionnaire been divided into sub-modules to deal with different types of actors 
such as moneylender, input dealer, the quality of data collected would have been 
improved. In fact the generalised approach opted in the questionnaire focussing 
upon sale/purchase of inputs and outputs almost led to exclusion of the transactions 
of pure moneylenders. Precisely because of this omission, the case studies of four 
areas (communities) were undertaken which supplemented the data collected 
through field survey and improved our understanding of informal credit market. 
1.3. Limitations of the Questionnaire Approach 
There arc certain inherent limitations of the questionnaire approach lo 
understand the rural informal credit system of Pakistan. These limitations made 
their appearance during ihe process of data collection and analyses. First, a large 
majority of ihe population in Pakistan is Muslim. This fact has particular relevance 
for a study on rural credit because Islamic laws prohibit ihe practice of lending on 
interest. Yet, on the other hand, lending on a fixed interest rate by moneylenders 
appears to be on the rise in boih rural and urban areas of the country. These lenders 
when interviewed generally did not admit their involvement in lending particularly 
when the required information was recorded on a questionnaire. Despite the initial 
plan to interview 35 moneylenders in Sindh, the field enumerators could not 
succeed in interviewing a single moneylender. Even where enumerators were 
successful in conducting interviews with moneylenders in other provinces, it was 
very difficult to extract information on the interest rate charged by them. 
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Second, il was found difficult to understand the mechanism of rural credit 
market by using a structured questionnaire. In the questionnaire used for the present 
study, informal sector traders were asked to report both their cash as well as credit 
transactions of different inputs, such as fertiliser, pesticides and seeds. This was 
needed to compute the mark-up rate, the differential between cash and credit price. 
The answers to these questions could be misleading in the circumstances where 
market prices exhibit more than one interpretation. Hence the need to supplement 
the information collected through questionnaire was real one. For example, the 
maximum retail price (MRP) written on a box (or a bottle) of a pesticide was 
reported to be almost equivalent to the credit price, while the cash price was 
determined by the fraction of commission, offered by the relevant pesticide 
manufacturing company passed on to cash buyers. It was this type of information 
that appeared to be elusive to structured questionnaires. 
Third, the success of an informal lender depended heavily on the recovery ol 
loans. In a questionnaire, the lender could only be asked to report about the 
methods he used to recover loans. Social pressure was the most commonly used 
measure for the recovery of loans. But what was a social pressure and how was it 
used to recover the loans? These questions could only be explored through 
participant observations and in-depth interviews not only of lenders but also of 
borrowers. 
Because of the above-mentioned limitations of the questionnaire approach, 
there has been an increased use of community or qualitative studies by the 
researchers to understand the functioning of the rural credit market [Saimwala etal. 
(1990); Aleem (1990)1. For the present study, it was, therefore, decided to 
supplement the survey data with four case studies. Observations made during the 
case studies however have been used extensively to supplement and qualify the 
results of the 1996 Survey of Informal Lenders, presented in the next two chapters 
while the case studies are discussed in the Appendix C. 
Chapter 2 
STRUCTURE OF INFORMAL CREDIT MARKET 
The structures and operations of informal credit system are likely to differ 
from region to region. The analysis in this report is therefore carried out by 
controlling the sample of informal lenders for province/region and, where possible, 
for ecological zones—irrigated and non-irrigated area. Also the observations made 
during the case studies have been used extensively. This chapter contains 
discussion of the structure in terms of type of lenders, the geographic dispersion, 
sources of funds and the cost at which these funds have been acquired by lenders. 
2.1. Types of Informal Lenders 
The term "lender" hardly appears appropriate to cover Ihe range of activities 
performed by operators in the informal credit market. The money is neither 
borrowed nor lent but credit transactions through the sale of goods made by 
different dealers constitute most of what is often characterised as informal credit 
market particularly in an environment where money lending can not be quantified. 
The distribution of these functionaries (lenders) as yielded by Ihe survey indicates 
that thirty six percent of the lenders covered in the 1996 survey are landlords/farm 
machinery suppliers, while the share of commission agents and inputs dealers is 32 
percent. Shopkeepers accounted for 15 percent of the total sample. The share of 
moneylenders and processing units in the sample are 2 and 3 percent respectively. It 
may be noted that the shares of different types of lenders arc somewhat pre-
determined in sample selection because of adjustment in the proportions yielded by 
census to capture the volume of credit transactions rather than the number of 
dealers. These adjustments arc already discusscd. 
This distribution, however, changed markedly by ecological zones within 
the provinces. About one-thirds of the informal lenders in non-irrigated areas were 
in 'others' category which, contained mainly livestock and poultry feed suppliers 
(Appendix Table B7). Commission agents were concentrated in irrigated/semi-
irrigated areas, where role of landlords as lenders also seemed to be important. 
Although the share of moneylenders and processing units in the total sample was 
small, they play a dual role in informal financial market. They could provide funds 
directly to the farmers and also indirectly through other informal lenders such as 
commission agents and input dealers. The volume of the business of processing 
units was therefore likely to be much larger than the one reported by other lenders. 
Wherever possible, data on processing units have been presented separately in the 
present report. 
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2.2. Geographic Distribution of Informal Lenders 
In general, lenders were located in towns, where a number of institutional 
sources of credit, mainly banks, were also located. The survey of informal lenders 
was conducted at 296 locations (Table 2.1 and Appendix Table A3). At 87 
locations, which account for 29 percent of the total locations covered four or more 
lenders were interviewed. In the case of Punjab, this ratio increased to 60 percent. 
Roughly half of the total locations covered in Sindh, two or more non-institutional 
lenders were interviewed at each place. Most of the locations, where four or more 
lenders were interviewed, were tehsil or district headquarters, such as Mirpur Khas 
in Sindh, Khuzdar in Balochistan and Patoki and Okara in Punjab. 
A similar observation was made during the four case studies. In Samundari, 
a tehsil headquarter in district Faisalabad, about 200 commission agents and 50 
input dealers were operating in the credit market. Eight moneylenders, who lent 
only to commission agents, were also identified in the same town. Concentration of 
informal lenders in small towns was explicable in that they could extend their 
operations to surrounding villages. People from rural areas could contact them 
easily at these places which were linked with the surrounding villages through 
roads. 
Table 2.1 
Locations by Lenders 
(Numbers) 
Number of 
Lenders 
Location (Province/Region) 
Punjab Sindh Others Total 
1 II 60 40 111 
2 19 27 20 66 
3 9 17 6 32 
4 - 1 0 45 16 9 70 
10+ 13 2 2 17 
Total 97 122 77 296 
Sonn e: 1996 Survey of Informal Lenders. 
On average, business of the informal lenders covered in the survey was 
spread over 9 villages. However, there were significant differences among different 
types of the lenders in terms of geographic coverage of their businesses. For 
instance, business of the commission agents was spread over 19 villages, while the 
corresponding number for the moneylenders was only 2. Similarly, lending 
business of landlords was limited on average to only 3 villages. The business ol 
commission agents was more widely spread in Sindh than their counterparts in 
Punjab and other provinces/regions (Sec Appendix Table A4). 
The above was suggestive of the fact that the widely held notion that 
informal lenders were invariably enjoying a monopoly vis-a-vis the borrowers 
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hard I \ found support from the data. The findings of the present study were 
consistent with that of Alcem (IWO) who showed that the often-imagined picture 
of a single village moneylender with monopoly power over clients in the \ illage did 
not hold true in the Chamber1 context. There were in fact a large number of lenders 
serving farmers in rural areas. Thus, rural non-institutional credit market could 
largely be regarded as being competitive. But some informal lenders, such as. 
landlords, may be well placed to function as monopolists because they were the 
sole source of credit for their tenants and it was possible that they may have 
overpriced their loans. 
2.3. Sources of Funds for Informal Lending 
Previous studies on rural informal financial market in Pakistan ignored the 
supply side of the market, particularly lenders' sources of fund. Unlike formal 
credit institutions, such as the commercial banks and ADBP, which depended 
entirely either on their deposits or on refinancing from the State Bank of Pakistan 
and/or foreign financial institutions, informal lenders varied considerably with 
respect to their sources of funds. One way of generating the funds could be to use 
credit institutions, banks and co-operative societies. These funds, in turn, could be 
lent on interest rate higher than what is paid. 
Table 2.2 shows that, on average, lenders were able lo generate about 
347.0(H) rupees during 1995-96. This amount varied considerably by type of 
informal lenders. Shopkeepers mobilised, on average, aboul 115,000 rupees, while 
in the case of input dealers, this average increased to 729,000 rupees. Moneylenders 
generated, on average, 275,000 rupees. It appeared that more funds were generated 
by those lenders engaged in sale of agricultural inputs such as fertiliser, pesticides 
and seeds. 
Table 2.2 
Average Amount of Funds Generated by Informal Lenders 
Average Amount of Funds 
Type of Lenders (Rupees) 
Commission Agents 469013 
Input Dealers 729216 
Commission Agents/Input Dealers 507773 
Landlords/Farm Machinery Suppliers 153362 
Professional Moneylenders 275402 
Shopkeepers 114856 
Others 435414 
Total 346529 
Sonn e: The 1996 Survey of Informal Lenders. 
The name of the area where Aleem conducted his study. 
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The case studies revealed that the volume of funds generated by 
moneylenders depended on the nature of their operations, which diversified over 
lime. For example, the moneylenders who operated in rural areas of Samundari 
extended generally small loans to local residents mainly for their consumption 
needs. The funds mobilised by these lenders varied between 35,000 and 150,000 
rupees. However, moneylenders of the Samundari town disbursing larger amounts 
to local commission agents were able to generate relatively larger funds. In other 
words, moneylenders could mobilise the funds by tapping variety of sources to 
meet the demands of their own business. To a large extent this applied to other 
categories of lenders too. 
Nearly two-thirds of the informal lenders reportedly relied on their own 
sources to run their businesses (Appendix Table A5) lending an impression of 
little dependence on external sources. The distribution of actual funds generated 
by informal lenders from various sources however indicated that about half of 
these funds were borrowed, and more than two-thirds of the borrowed funds 
were obtained from banks or societies (Table 2.3). This suggested that one-
thirds of the total funds utilised in informal credit transactions originated from 
the formal credit system. 
About 83 percent of the total funds obtained from banks/societies were 
utilised by a single category of lenders, i.e. the processing units. Commission 
agents and landlords were the other main users of formal credit institutions 
(Appendix Table A6). It appeared that a good deal of interlinkage existed between 
the funds lent by formal credit institutions and the volume of credit transacted in the 
informal credit market. The institutions or influential persons in the society, who 
could also offer collateral, borrowed from the formal sector for onward lending in 
the informal sector presumably at higher rates of interest. 
Table 2.3 
Percentage Distribution of Funds by Sources and Type of Lenders 
All Own Sources Borrowed Friends and 
Type of Lenders Sources (percent) Formal Sources Informal Sources Relatives* 
Commission Agents I(X) 78.3 2.6 19.1 0.9 
Inpul Dealers 100 84.0 5.0 11.0 3.3 
Commission Agents/ 
Input Dealers UK) 45.5 21.7 32.8 3.0 
Landlords/Farm 
Machinery Suppliers 100 71.8 15.1 13.1 3.6 
Moneylenders 1(H) 62.6 0.0 37.4 5.0 
Processing Units 100 26.6 69.6 3.8 0.0 
Shopkeepers 100 72.3 3.8 23.9 6.0 
Others 100 59.9 7.3 32.8 2.2 
Total 100 52.0 33.2 14.8 2.2 
Total (Excluding 
Processing Units) 100 68.4 9.6 22.0 2.9 
Sonn e: The 19% Survey of Informal Lenders. 
•Friends and relatives are included in 'informal sources'. 
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2.4. Ability to Generate Funds 
Whilst it was not possible to examine the effect of all possible factors on the 
ability of informal lenders to generate resources, an attempt was made to 
investigate the impact of some socio-demographic factors in this context. Both 
bivariate and multivariate analyses were undertaken. (For detail of these factors, see 
Appendix B). 
In the bivariate analyses, total funds generated by informal lenders were 
divided according lo sources of funds: own, formal and informal. They were 
controlled for education, landownership and work experience. The multivariate 
analysis focussed on funds borrowed either from formal or from informal sources. 
In other words funds generated from own sources were excluded in the multivariate 
analysis. 
The bivariate analysis suggests that level of lenders' educational attainment 
appeared to be associated with specific types of sources of funds (Appendix Table 
A7). Informal lenders with no formal education depended heavily on non-
institutional sources of credit. For those informal lenders who were graduates (BA) 
or above, this dependency shifted to some extent to formal sources of credit. 
Similarly lenders owning less than 7 acres of agricultural land were more likely to 
borrow from non-institutional sources than the lenders who owned more than 7 
acres. 
The duration of experience in the business reveals a positive association with £ 
the proportion of funds borrowed. The influence of work experience in this 
business on the funds borrowed from different sources is suggestive of a tendency 
(hat the lenders initiated their business mainly with their own savings. With the 
passage of time and expansion in the volume of business they needed extra funds. 
Their long experience of financial market enabled them to benefit from the formal 
sources, probably through developing good contacts with the staff of local bank 
branches as well as acquiring desired credit worthiness. 
The multivariate analysis, where funds borrowed from banks and co-
operatives as proportion of total funds borrowed by informal lenders were used as 
the dependent variable, yielded some interesting results. Processing units and 
landlords were more likely than other lenders to borrow funds from banks and co-
operatives. In contrast, commission agents/input dealers were less likely than others 
to rely on the formal sector for funds (Table 2.4). It seems that ability to provide 
collateral, and size of funds required influenced the choice of the sources. < 
Landlords could use their land as a means (collateral) to obtain loans from formal 
credit institutions. Similarly processing units enjoyed the same privileges and got 
the required funds from formal sources. 
According to the multivariate analysis, commission agents/input dealers, 
whose funds requirements were likely to be lower than the processing units, 
depended primarily on the informal sector. This finding was consistent with the 
observations made during the case studies. For example, in Samundari several 
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Table 2.4 
Factors Affecting Capability of Lenders to Borrow from Formal Sector 
(Dependent Variable = Funds Borrowed from Formal Sector as 
Proportion of Total Borrowed Funds) 
Variables Estimated Coefficients T-ratios 
Constant 0.6999 11.53 
Type of Lenders 
Commission Agents/Input Dealers -0.1371 2.26* 
Professional Moneylenders -0 .0861 0.46 
Processing Units 0.1623 1.82** 
Landlords 0.15008 2.09* 
Others - -
Previous Occupation 
Agriculture 0.1861 2.66** 
Service -0 .1460 2.49* 
No Previous Occupation - -
Lending Experience 
5 - 1 0 years -0 .1397 2.38* 
> 10 Years -0 .1317 2.17* 
< 5 Years - _ 
Ecological Zones 
Non-irrigated 0.3031 1.17 
Irrigated - -
R2 0.32 
F 5.36 P< 0.0000 
Sunn <:\ The 1996 Survey of Informal Lenders. 
Significant at 0.05 level of confidence. 
Significant at 0.10 level of confidence. 
commission agents were reported to have obtained loans from the local 
moneylenders on a 4 percent monthly rate of interest. The duration of loan was 
generally of a short duration, ranging between three to six months. 
Table 2.4 also reflects that the occupation held by informal lenders before 
entering into this business had an effect on the sources of funds. Informal lenders 
who were engaged in the agriculture sector prior to their entry into the lending 
business more often borrowed funds from banks and co-operatives. Lenders who 
were employed in the services sector before their involvement in this business 
relied less on formal sources. Probably they did not own property (land) as well as 
experience to borrow funds from banks or co-operatives. 
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2.5. Cost of Borrowing by Lenders 
Little has yet been done in the studies of rural financial market in Pakistan to 
estimate the cost of borrowing, such as interest rate paid by informal lenders on the 
funds borrowed. This is important since a substantial proportion of funds generated 
was through borrowings either from formal or informal sources. In the 
questionnaire respondents were asked to report the total funds generated during 
1995-96. Also the information was solicited on annual interest rate and duration of 
loan by source of funds. Reporting of this information remained somewhat unclear. 
It was observed during the data analyses that interest rate was recorded annually 
only for those loans which were obtained from banks and co-operatives. In case of 
other sources, the reported interest rale presumably pertained lo the duration of 
these loans, which was generally less than six months. The information on annual 
rate of interest as per requirement of the questionnaire was not provided in case of 
the funds obtained from informal sources. In an effort to seek clarification 
enumerators and supervisors of the survey were consulted. They confirmed that the 
interest rate on loans obtained from non-institutional sources was recorded for ihe 
duration of the loan. The reported information was therefore corrected to reflect 
annual rate of interest. 
In addition, many informal lenders covered in the survey have obtained 
loans from their friends and relatives. Mostly zero interest rate was reported against 
these borrowings. Of the 86 lenders who borrowed from friends and relatives 68 
reported zero interest rate. These cases were excluded while computing the interest 
rate. Admittedly, the underlay assumptions where in zero interest rate has been 
excluded could be questionable and would inflate the rate of interest. 
Table 2.5 shows that on average informal lenders paid less than 19 percent 
annual interest on their funds borrowed from (he formal credit institutions. In the 
case of borrowings from informal sources, (his rate was about 23 percent. The 
annual interest on loans from friends and relatives was 28 percent in the cases 
where it was reported. 
Tabic 2.5 
Average Annual Interest Rate by Sources of Funds 
Sources of Funds Interest Rate (Percent) 
All Informal Sources 
Factories/Mills 
Friends/Relatives* 
Other Informal Sources 
Formal Sources 18.8 
22.8 
27.1 
28.4 
19.7 
Source: The 19% Survey of Informal Lenders 
* Out of 86 lenders who borrowed from friends/relatives, only 18 reported interest rate. 
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The interest rate paid by informal lenders on non-institutional credit 
classified by the type of lender, province/region and ecological zones is reported in 
Appendix Table A8. Both, commission agents and input dealers, obtained loans on 
relatively higher interest rate than their counterparts. One likely reason could be 
their relatively higher level of dependency on moneylenders. In Samundari, for 
example, it was reported that commission agents generally obtained loans from 
moneylenders on 4 percent monthly rate of interest. They were required to pay the 
amount of interest monthly (for details see Appendix C). Regular interest payments 
to moneylenders persuaded them not to press for the return of principle amount. 
It is also evident from Appendix Table A8 that interest rate paid by informal 
lenders operating in irrigated areas was higher than in non-irrigated areas. Similarly 
it was higher in Punjab than in Sindh and other provinces/regions. This could be 
partly due to compositional change in the sources of funds having different costs 
and partly because of the volume of credit demand that may have been higher in 
irrigated areas and in Punjab province. 
In short, both the survey data and the case studies suggest that informal 
lenders depended primarily on their own sources to run their lending businesses. 
However, it also appeared that formal credit institutions provided substantial funds 
too, particularly in the case of processing units, commission agents and landlords. 
Although it was not uncommon for informal lenders to obtain interest free loans 
from friends and relatives, in general they paid interest on all types of loans. 
Chapter 3 
INFORMAL CREDIT—PROCEDURES. VOLUME AND COSTS 
3.1. Screening the Borrowers 
In the absence of any collateral in non-institutional credit market, 
considerable effort has to be made to obtain information about prospective 
borrowers to reduce the risk of default. Thus a careful screening process has to be 
undertaken by lender. The survey data show that the previous experience of a 
lender with borrower was the most commonly used method of screening (Appendix 
Table A9). In addition, personal relations of informal lenders with potential 
borrowers and testing them by giving a small initial loan for one season seems to be 
another important method to determine the credit worthiness of the borrowers. This 
pattern of assessment prevails for all types of informal lenders. On average, 
informal lenders spent one day on screening loan applications (Appendix Table 
A10). It seems that informal lenders select borrowers carefully, but the borrowers 
may not be fully aware of the terms and conditions of the informal lenders for 
extension of credit. 
3.2. Lending Volume and Composition 
In the questionnaire, borrowers were classified into seven groups: small 
farmers (<12.5 acres), medium farmers (12.5-25 acres), large farmers (>25 acres), 
landless, livestock holders, shopkeepers/wholesalers and others. Lenders were 
asked to report their transactions in cash or kind to each type of borrower. 
Informal lenders reported to have on average 44 borrowers at the time of the 
survey. Small farmers constituted 38 percent of the total borrowers, while the 
shares of medium and large farmers were 22 and 9 percent, respectively (Table 
3.1). About 6 percent of the borrowers were shopkeepers/wholesalers. The average 
amount of loan per borrower was slightly more than 10,000 rupees. If the loans 
disbursed by processing units were included, the average rose to 31,400 rupees.1 
The results of the 1996 survey of informal lenders are in line with the previous 
JTo ensure the supply of cotton, some ginning factories have developed close contacts willi local 
cotton-growers by supplying them fertiliser and pesticides on credit through their agents. Mark-up on 
these inputs is similar to the mark-up charged by local input dealers. The ginning factories make the 
booking of required quantity of fertiliser and pesticides in the month of March. According to key 
informants, the owners of the factories use bank guarantees, which arc valid for 6 to <J months, for this 
booking. Banks charge a nominal interest rate on these guarantees. 
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study by Qureshi and Shah (1992), wherein average amounts borrowed by 
households in 1988 were around eight thousands rupees from non-institutional 
sources. The average amount of loan (excluding processing units) varied 
substantially among the borrowers, around 800 rupees for livestock holders to 
about 25,000 rupees for large farmers. Average amount borrowed by large farmers 
was more than four limes that of the small farmers (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 
A vercige Amount of Loan Borrowed from Informal Sector by Type of Borrower 
(Ru pees) 
Distribution of Average Size of Loan (Rupees) 
Borrowers Including Excluding 
Type of Borrowers (Percent) Processing Units Processing Units 
Small Farmers 37.9 6555 5750 
Medium Farmers 21.6 15322 13810 
Large Farmers 9.1 27144 24761 
Landless 14.8 8592 8459 
Livestock Holders 6.0 1974 822 
ShopkeepersAVholesalers 6.2 6242 6153 
Others 4.4 491016 24970 
All 100.0 31404 10185 
Source: The 1996 Survey of Informal Lenders. 
Note: Small fanners < 12.5 acres; medium farmers 12.5-25.0 acres; and large farmers 25+ acres. 
The share of small farmers in total volume of credit (excluding the credit 
provided by processing units) was 21 percent (Appendix Table A12 last column), 
while, as noted earlier, they constituted 38 percent of the total borrowers. In 
contrast, large farmers (9 percent of the total borrowers) were able to obtain 22 
percent of the total credit. Farmers and shopkeepers/wholesalers borrowed 
primarily from commission agents and input dealers, while processing units were 
(lie main source of funds for livestock holders (Appendix Table A12, row-wise 
percentages). 
3.3. Interest Rate and Mark-up 
Credit transactions lake place through the sale of inputs used in agricultural 
production and consumption goods. In the questionnaire therefore ihere was no 
question soliciting information directly on interest charged on the loans. Instead the 
lenders (arhtis, commission agents and input dealers etc.) were asked to report 
prices and quantity of commodities sold both in cash and on credit. The 
differentials between cash and credit price facilitate calculation of mark-up. It may 
also be noted that traders who sell inputs on credit may buy ihe farm produce of 
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borrower to recover the loan. To the extent the borrowers are paid less than the 
market price it constitutes an element of interest on borrowings. 
The differentials on credit and cash prices in the survey were collected for 
major agricultural inputs such as fertilisers, seeds and pesticides and not on 
consumption goods. In other words information obtained from nearly one-half of 
the lenders/traders is utilised to arrive at mark-up which acts as a surrogate of 
interest rate. A questionnaire approach to extract such an information confronts 
many problems and results in serious underestimation of mark-up. This is reflected 
in the difference between the mark-up estimated on the basis of survey information 
and that of the case studies in the Table 3.2. 
The estimated average annual mark-up on the basis of survey data worked 
out to be 18 percent. It. however, differs widely across the types of inputs: 19 
percent for fertiliser and 35 percent for pesticides. The estimated average price 
differential for different crops purchased by lenders is about 2 percent. The case 
studies support these findings, although the credit prices of different inputs 
reported by informal lenders during the survey seem to be lower than the prices 
reported in case studies. Implying thai the survey results could be under 
estimating the mark-up. 
Table 3.2 
Average AnnuelI Mark-up (Interest) by Inputs 
(Percentage) 
Inputs Mark-up 
Fertiliser 18.6 (29.0) 
Pesticides 35.2 
Seeds 7.8 
Other Inputs 8.0 
All Inputs 18.0(25.0) 
Salin e: The 1996 Survey of Informal Lenders. 
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate mark-up on llie basis of the information obtained through the 
case studies. 
The main reason for the high mark-up on pesticides (more than 35 percent) 
is due to the fact that pesticides arc used heavily by cotton-growers during the 
months of June and October. Invariably all pesticide manufacturers start booking 
for their product in January. Early booking means high rate of commission lot-
dealers. which varies from about 25 percent in case of multinational companies to 
over 60 percent for some national companies (for details see case studies). The 
commission is given on the Maximum Retail Price (MRP) written on every box or 
bottle of a pesticide. At the end of a season, the pesticide companies also give a 
'rebate' to input dealers/commission agents on there total purchases, and its rate 
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varies between 2 to 7 percent. Generally input dealers book in advance. The 
farmers may also book in advance subject to the availability of funds. 
Input dealers sell the early-booked pesticides to farmers in cash or credit. 
Cash prices of pesticides are usually much lower than the MRPs because the sellers 
(input dealers/commission agents) give up some portion of their commission in 
order to get 'rebate' from the respective companies. For sale on credit, input dealers 
not only charge the full MRP of the pesticide sold but sometimes they charge more 
than the written price, particularly on the products of multinational companies, such 
as of Ciba-Gaigy and Bayer, which offer relatively low commissions to input 
dealers. It is a common practice among input dealers to sell on credit those 
pesticides, which yield higher rate of commission. Although the mark-up on 
pesticides varies between 20 to 60 percent, it depends on the nature of product 
being purchased and on the relations between the borrower and the dealer. The 
likelihood that price of an input sold on credit varies substantially among borrowers 
cannot be ruled out (for detail sec case studies). 
The case of fertiliser appears different from the pesticides. Any dealer can 
arrange booking for the required quantity of fertiliser by sending full payment 
through a bank draft to the nearest fertiliser company. The dealers are eligible to 
receive only 8 rupees per bag of fertiliser as their commission from the company. 
This commission is usually their only profit if they sell fertiliser in cash. However, 
if they sell it on credit, they charge an extra 100 rupees per bag of urea fertiliser. 
The market price of a bag of the urea fertiliser at the time of case studies, was 350 
rupees. In other words the mark-up on credit sale comes to around 29 percent. The 
foregoing discussion is reflcctive of the difficulties entailed in arriving at a mark-
up. Not only docs it vary across different commodilies but also is influcnccd by the 
commission offered by manufacturers. 
It was noted earlier that not all the informal lenders in the sample were 
involved in selling inputs or buying outputs from their customers. As discussed 
earlier, one of the limitations of ihe questionnaire administered to informal lenders 
was that it did not contain questions or sub-modules to reckon with ihe variation in 
transactions of different types of lenders. It was thus not possible to determine ihe 
rate of interest charged by these lenders in particular the pure moneylender. 
However, (his was investigated during the conduct of case studies. Il may be added 
that this subset of information was provided by borrowers of the area, not the 
moneylender themselves. 
Moneylenders extend credit to farmers, commission agents, input dealers 
and livestock dealers for different durations and at different rates of interest. 
Lenders who lend money to farmers charge 40 lo 50 percent interest for the 
duration of 8 to 10 months. The monthly interest of those who lend mainly to 
landless households is between 10 and 13 percent. Some moneylenders disburse 
loans to only commission agents on a monthly interest of 4 percent. They also give 
loans to livestock dealers on similar terms and conditions. Information pertaining to 
one location where case studies were conducted is provided below in Table 3.3. 
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Table 2.4 
Transaction of Moneylenders in Rural and Urban Areas of Samundari Tehsil 
No. of 
Monev lenders Type of Purpose of Loan Per Monthly Interest 
Area Identified Borrowers Loan Borrower (Rs) Rate (Percent) 
Rural 5 Small Fanners/ Consumption/ 30.000 4 -13 
Live Stock Health/Live (10) 
holders slock Purchase 
Urban 8 Commission Business 150,000 4 
Agents 
Sum i. Case Studies (See for details in Appendix C). 
Figures in parenthesis denoles average rate of interest. 
Thus the information gathered through the survey and case studies 
suggest that the mark-up estimated on credit extended through sale of 
agricultural input ranges between 18 percent (survey) to 25 percent (case 
studies). The interest rate in case of pure money lending works out to 48 percent 
per year for commission agents and climbs up to an exorbitant rate of 120 
percent per year for landless households. 
3.4. Purpose of Borrowing 
It is widely held that rural households borrow from informal sources to 
meet their consumption needs besides production and investment purposes . 
Malik (1992), for example, showed that a considerable amount of in-kind loan 
was extended by shopkeepers to facilitate the daily consumption needs of the 
rural households. It may be added that the lenders reported the purpose for 
which the credit was extended. This survey did not cover borrowers. According 
to this survey of informal lenders, approximately 90 percent of the total amount 
disbursed by the lenders was meant for production and investment purposes 
(Appendix Table A13). Commission agents and input dealers did not general ly 
advance loans for consumption needs. However, a substantial proport ion of 
loans disbursed by shopkeepers, moneylenders and landlords was used for the 
daily consumption needs of the borrowers (Appendix Table A13). 
There is a considerable variation in the purpose of borrowing by 
province/region and ecological zones. In Sindh one-fifth of the loan was extended 
to meet the daily consumption needs of borrowers, while in Punjab it was only 5 
pcrcent (Appendix Table A13). In other provinces informal sources lent only for 
production and investment purposes. In non-irrigated areas, 17 percent of the total 
loan was given for poultry and dairy production, which reflects the concentration of 
these activities in these areas. Borrowing for this purpose was not reported from 
irrigated areas. 
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3.5. Cost of Lending Operations 
This sub-scction is mainly concerned with the administrative cost of 
lending, comprising of overhead cost and other variable costs. A major problem 
in estimating average administrative costs is that of allocating the costs between 
lending activities and other activities carried out simultaneously by the informal 
lenders. According to Aleem (1990), the allocation of administrative cost to the 
lending operation depends on the assumption regarding the lender's main 
activity. All administrative costs can be allocated to the lending operation, if it is 
considered to be the primary activity of the lender. Allocation of administrative 
cost is difficult, if lending is considered a joint activity. It can be distributed 
according to the time allocated to various activities by the lender if such an 
information exists. In the survey of informal lenders, respondents were not 
asked to provide information about their other business activities and no 
information was obtained regarding time allocation among different business 
activities. Therefore, it is difficult to separate the administrative costs due to 
lending from resi of the activities. 
Three types of costs were reported in the survey: overhead costs, labour 
costs and other costs. Approximately half of the lenders did not report any type 
of cost. These lenders were excluded while computing the average cost (See 
Table 3.4).The average annual overhead cost of lenders was more than 7,000 
rupees (Column I). It varied from Rs 516 for moneylenders and about Rs 15.000 
in case of commission agents. The average labour cost per lender was about 
1 1,000 rupees (Column 2). while the average of 'other costs' was more than 
8,000 rupees. Thus, the total transaction cost of informal lenders on the average 
constituted only five percent of the total volume of lending. 
Table 3.4 
Average Annual Transac tion Cost by Informal Lenders 
Overhead Cost Labour Cost Other Costs 
Type of Lenders (Rs) (Rs) (Rs) 
Commission Agent 
Input Dealers 
Commission Agent/Input Dealers 
Landlord/Farm Machinery 
Professional Moneylenders 
Shopkeepers 
Others 
All 
14649 
I 1069 
14497 
1523 
516 
4328 
12560 
7155 
23553 
12494 
19332 
8488 
2271 
2589 
9345 
10831 
6770 
9044 
8046 
10839 
2060 
1782 
9408 
8040 
.Voi/iro The I 9 % Survey ol' Informal Lenders. 
3.6. Default Rate and Recover}' of Loans 
Success of an informal lender in his business depends largely on the 
recovery of loans. Repayment of loans can be made in cash or kind. One way of 
ensuring the recovery is to get commitment from the borrowers to sell their outputs 
to the lenders if it falls in the domain of the business of lenders. About three-
quarters of the lenders did not report any commitment from their borrowers. 
However, commission agents were an exception. Approximately 40 percent of the 
commission agents reported that their borrowers were committed to sell all outputs 
to them. 
The question is whether informal lenders were successful in recovering 
loans? In the survey, lenders were asked to report number of borrowers who did 
not return loan last year. Similarly they were asked to report the amount which 
could not be recovered at scheduled time of payment. From this information, 
default rates for both the number of borrowers and funds were estimated. Table 3.5 
shows that 15 percent of borrowers, which account for 12 percent of volume of 
credit, failed to pay at the scheduled time. Commission agents and input dealers 
who loaned large amounts and who generally got commitment from borrowers of 
selling their outputs were able to recover more than 90 percent of their loans. 
Shopkeepers faced relatively greater risk of non-recovery of their loans. 
However, the proportion of loan, which could not be returned, may not be 
strictly called default rate, because some of the more recent overdue loans may 
eventually be recovered. It was difficult to estimate how much of the overdue loans 
were likely to be recovered after the stipulated date. In the survey lenders were asked 
to report the reasons for non-payment of loans and they were also asked whether or 
not they extended loans to those who could not repay at the scheduled lime. 
Table 3.5 
Default Rate by Borrowers and Funds Controlling for Type of Lenders 
Type of Lenders 
Borrowers Who Did 
not Pay Loan ( %) at 
Scheduled Time 
Amount of Loan 
Which Could not be 
Returned ( %) 
Commission Agents 8 7 
Inpul Dealer 9 7 
Input Dealers/Commission Agents 10 8 
Landlords/Farm Machinery Owners 8 10 
Processing Units 21 14 
Moneylenders 18 13 
Shopkeeper 17 17 
Others 12 9 
Total 15 12 
Source: The 1996 Survey of Informal Lenders. 
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According to the survey, financial difficulty and crop failure were the main 
reasons for non-payment of loans (Appendix Table A14). But 47 percent of the 
lenders covered in the survey extended additional loans despite the fact that the 
borrowers failed to pay back at due lime last year (Table 3.6). If the reason for non-
payment of loan was crop failure, this percentage increased to 62; probably in order 
lo ensure the recovery of loans during the next crop. 
Table 3.6 
Proportion of Informal Lenders Who Extended Additional Loans to Those 
Borrowers Who Could not Return Loan Last Year by Reasons 
for Non-Payment of Loan 
percent of Informal Lenders Who 
Reasons for Non-Payment of Loan Extend Additional Loan 
Crop Failure/Natural Disaster 61.6 
Financial Difficulties 37.2 
Others 33.2 
All 46.8 
Source: The 1996 Survey of Informal Lenders. 
Table 3.7 shows that 9 percent of loans recovered last year were paid after 
Ihe scheduled lime, and on average the delay was of 8 months. In the case of 
commission agents and input dealers the duration of this delayed payment 
increased to 11 months. Based on this information it is estimated that lenders would 
be able to recover more than half of the overdue loans during the next crop. The 
ultimate default rate is thus likely to decline to less than 6 percent. The views of the 
researchers engaged in survey and case studies tend to support this estimate. 
Table 3.7 
Proportion of Loans Returned After the Due Date and Mean Duration of Delay 
Proportion of Loans 
Returned Alter Ihe Due 
Date (Percenl) 
Mean Duration of 
Delay (Months) 
Commission Agents 9 11 
Input Dealers 8 11 
Commission Agents/Input Dealers 9 2 
Processing Units 8 3 
Landlords/Farm Machinery Owners 7 7 
Moneylenders 12 2 
Shopkeepers 14 9 
Others 8 14 
All 9 8 
Sonn e The 1996 Survey of Informal Lenders. 
Informal lenders in general relied on personal and social pressures to 
recover loans. It is not common among these lenders to use the legal system of 
the country for the recovery of loan (Appendix Table A15). It was observed 
during the case studies that the meaning and use of 'social pressure' is specific 
to the type of lender. Commission agents and input dealers usually extend credit 
without any collateral or written agreement. Recovery of their loans is generally 
smooth. In order to maintain good relationship with the dealers and in view of 
their future needs for credit, farmers normally return the borrowed money. In the 
case of crop failure, the recovery of full loan is very difficult, and many 
commission agents and input dealers wait for the next crop for the recovery of 
their loans. Some, however, do adjust loans by transferring moveable or 
immovable property of the borrowers in their name. This is usually done with 
the help of influential people of the area. 
Moneylenders extended loans through mediators, local councillors or 
landlords, and recover their loans by using the influence of these intermediaries. 
Some moneylenders were found powerful enough to force borrowers to hand over 
to them jewellery, livestock and farm machinery to adjust the loans. Even in some 
instances land was taken from borrowers by moneylenders in lieu of the loan, (see 
case studies Appendix C). 
Chapter 4 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The structure of informal credit market in Pakistan is examined in the 
present study by combining two approaches; a field survey administering semi-
struclured-questionnaire to more than 1000 informal lenders supplemented by case 
studies. The field survey was undertaken in four provinces of the country and AJK 
while the case studies were conducted in four small towns of the Punjab province. 
The main findings of the study are as follows: 
1. Nolwilhslanding substantial expansion in the formal credit institutions the 
predominance of the informal rural credit is manifest from its reportedly 
high share in total credit extended to rural population in cash and/or kind. 
However, a good deal of interlinkages exists between formal and informal 
credit institutions. According to this survey around one-third of the credit 
extended by informal lenders is provided by formal sector institutions like 
banks. Processing units, landlords and other influential persons borrow 
from the banks for onward lending through informal channels. 
2. In addition to availability of funds from formal sector, informal credit 
system draws heavily on additional sources including friends and 
moneylenders. Informal operators were successful in generating on an 
average Rs 347 thousands for the business. This however ranged from 114 
thousands in case of shopkeeper to Rs 729 thousands for input dealer. 
Interest rate paid on the borrowed funds was 19 percent in case of formal 
sector while the same was 23 percent if the source of funds was informal. 
However moneylenders charged much higher rate of interest ranging from 
48 percent lo 120 percent. 
3. Except landlords and shopkeepers, informal lenders were concentrated in 
towns, which is a better location to extend their operations lo surrounding 
villages. On average, ihc business of commission agents was spread over 
19 villages, while for both moneylenders and landlords it was only 2 
villages each. 
4. Informal credit market can be characterised as competitive. The locations 
covered in the survey had more than one dealer or lender. If a monopolistic 
situation prevails in the market it is because of peculiar relationship 
between lender and borrower, such as landlord vs. tenant. 
5. On average informal lenders spent one day lo make a decision before 
disbursing the loan to a borrower. The previous experience of a lender was 
the most commonly stated method used lo select the borrowers. The 
average cost on screening a loanec was reported lo be nominal, only 18 
rupees. 
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6. Informal lenders reported to have on average 44 borrowers at the time of 
survey. The average amount of loan per borrower was more than 10.000 
rupees. This average displays wide variations across different type of 
lenders as well as borrowers. For instance large farmers on the average 
were extended a credit of Rs. 25000 in contrast to Rs. 6000 for small 
farmers during the year of 1995-96. These averages alter substantially if the 
credit extended by processing units is incorporated. 
7. Small farmers constituted 38 percent of the total borrowers, but their share 
in total credit was only 21 percent. It appears that like the formal financial 
market, lenders in the informal markets also follow credit worthiness as the 
major criteria to lend. This reduces considerably the level of funds 
allocated to less privileged and assetless. 
8. It is not easy to provide a firm estimate of the mark-up that can be regarded 
as interest rate charged on credit transactions made by informal lenders. 
Mark-up lends to vary from product to product and also by type of 
borrower as well as lender. On the average, however, the mark-up is 25 
percent. In the case of fertiliser it is estimated to be 29 perccnt while for the 
pesticides it comes around 35 percent. 
9. High mark-up charged on the pesticides sold on credit is mostly due to 
rather unholy alliance between the manufacturers and traders/dealers. 
Multinationals, like Ciba Gaigy. offer 25 percent commission to dealers for 
six months advance booking. Some domestic manufacturers even pay 60 
percent commission in addition to 5 to 7 percent rebate on total volume of 
transactions. Farmers who buy pesticides in cash arc sold at prices lower 
than the prices printed on boxes/bottles hence some commission gels passed 
on lo them. However, those who buy on credit have to pay lull printed price. 
One fails lo understand this high commission policy of manufacturers. This 
aggressive salesmanship needs lo be investigated further. Not only does the 
farmer end up paying higher prices but he also gets substandard product 
particularly from those manufacturers who pay high commissions. 
10. The results of the case studies carried out in some areas in Punjab show that 
pure money lending is on the rise with quite exploitative interest rates 
ranging from 48 percent to 120 percent per year. Failure of cotton crop for 
the last three years, and increasing requirements of farmers for inputs partly 
explain this rise. The high rate of interest can also be attributed to illegal 
nature of the business. Legal registration of this business is likely to bring 
down the interest rate. If this is not politically palatable then there is a real 
need to introduce some sort of crop insurance scheme as well as innovative 
credit schemes such as group based lending. 
11. Approximately 90 percent of the total credit disbursed by the lenders was 
given for production and investment purposes. Only shopkeepers, landlords 
and moneylenders extended some loans for daily consumption. Information 
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on purpose of loan was provided by lenders. It is possible that ultimate use 
of the credit was different to an unknown extent than the one cited above. 
12. Though we cannot be conclusive on cost effectiveness of formal versus 
informal lenders, but a crude measure such as total cost of lenders 
(overhead, administrative and labour costs) per volume of credit transaction 
ranges between 3 percent to 5 percent in case of informal sector. In contrast 
similar crude estimates for ADBP work out to be 14 percent. Further in 
depth investigation appears in order. 
13. The ultimate default rate for total loans disbursed was estimated to be less 
than 6 percent. Generally the borrowers pay the loans because they would 
like to maintain the credit line. Social pressure was the commonly used 
method to recover loans which arc not paid back. For some lenders social 
pressure means use of power to get back their loans. Some moneylenders 
were reportedly powerful enough to take land from the borrowers in lieu of 
unpaid loan. 
Appendices 
APPENDIX A 
STATISTICAL TABLES 
Appendix Table A1 
Percentage Distribution of Total Borrowing by Source 
(Percent) 
1973 1985a 1985b 1990 1996 
Sources (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Institutional Sources 9.8 39.5 58.5 23.6 22.0 
Non-institutional Sources 90.2 60.5 41.2 76.4 78.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Malik (1989); Malik (1991). 
Notes: The first rural credit survey was conducted in 1973. This survey covered 94082 households. The 
second rural credit survey that covered 54987 household was conducted in 1985. In 1990. 2300 
households were selected from the lists of 1985 rural credit survey. Out of them, a sample of 
633 household was drawn by IFPRI. Col. 4. 1985(b) and Col. 5 of 1990 presents the distribution 
credit acquired by these households. 
(a) Column 3 reports the results of full sample thai are comparable with the results of Rural Credit 
Survey 1973. 
(b) Column 4 reports the results of the selected sample of the Rural Credit Survey 1985 in order to 
make a comparison between the findings of 1985 and 1990. The sample consists of 633 
households. 
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Appendix Table A2 
Percentage Distribution of Informal Lenders by Province/ 
Region and Ecological Zones, IV96 
Province/Region Ecological Zones 
Type of Informal Lenders Pakistan 
Punjab Sindh Other* Irrigated Semi-
irrigated 
Non-
irrigated 
Commission Agents 11.6 15.8 7.2 5.7 12.0 21.1 4.6 
Input Dealers 11.0 9.3 9.5 19.0 11.2 10.5 10.0 
Commission Agents/Inputs Dealers 10.0 13.6 6.1 5.2 11.3 5.3 3.8 
Pressing Units 2.4 2.0 3.8 I.I 2.7 1.7 0.8 
Landlords/Machinery Suppliers 35.8 33.6 44.4 28.2 36.7 47.4 24.6 
Professional Moneylenders 3.4 4.4 - 5.2 3.1 3.5 5.4 
Shopkeepers 14.5 13.2 18.8 11.5 14.3 8.8 18.5 
Poultry Feed Dealers/Others 11.3 7.8 10.2 24.1 8.7 1.7 32.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(N) (1018) (551) (293) (174) (831) (57) (130) 
Source: The 1996 Survey of Informal Lenders. 
* NWFP. Baluchistan and AJK arc included in 'others'. 
Appendix Table A3 
Number of Locations Where Survey was Conducted by Number of 
Lenders and Ecological Zones 
(Numbers) 
Number of Ecological Zones 
Lenders Irrigated Semi-irrigated Non-irrigated Total 
1 84 17 10 111 
2 43 13 10 66 
3 27 1 4 32 
4 - 1 0 58 2 10 70 
10+ 15 0 2 17 
Total 227 73 36 296 
Source: The 1996 Survey of Informal Lenders. 
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A p p e n d i x T a b l e A2 
Distribution of Funds by Sources of Funds, Lenders' Level of Educational 
Attainment. Land Ownership and Work Experience 
Sources of Funds 
Lenders' Characteristics Own Savings Formal Sources Informal Sources Total 
Level of Educational Attainment 
Illiterate 57.8 10.7 31.5 100.0 
Primary 75.1 3.1 21.8 100.0 
Middle 66.1 6.1 27.7 100.0 
Matnculalion 67.1 10.6 22.3 100.0 
Intermediate 72.4 4.6 23.0 100.0 
Graduate and Above 64.4 18.7 16.8 100.0 
Land Ownership 
No Land 70.5 14.4 15.1 100.0 
1 -6 Acres 55.0 3.7 41.3 100.0 
7-12 Acres 67.8 8.7 23.5 100.0 
13+ Acres 70.0 4.9 25.1 100.0 
Work Experience 
< 5 Years 75.1 7.2 17.7 100.0 
5-10 Years 67.2 6.4 26.4 100.0 
11+Years 65.0 12 2 22.8 100.0 
All 67.9 9.3 22.8 100.0 
Sources: The 1996 Survey of Informal Lenders. 
A p p e n d i x T a b i c A 8 
Average Annual Interest Rate Paid by Type of Informal Lenders to Informal 
Source of Credit Controlling for Province and Ecological Zones 
(Percentage) 
Type of Lenders/Province/Ecological Zones Interest Rate ( %) 
Type of Lenders 
Commission Agents 26.8 
Input Dealers 26.8 
Commission Agents/Input Dealers 28.9 
Processing Units 26.5 
Landlords/Farm Machinery Suppliers 17.1 
Moneylenders 20.0 
Shopkeepers 22.3 
Others 21.3 
Province/Regions 
Punjab 27.3 
Sindh 20.7 
Others 16.5 
Ecological Zones 
Irrigated 23.2 
Non-irrigated 15.7 
Total 22.8 
Source: The 1996 Survey of Informal Lenders. 

Appendix Table A10 
Average Time Spent by Lenders on Assessment of Borrowers and Average 
Assessment Cost of Informal Lenders by Methods of Assessment 
Methods of Assessment 
Average Time Spent 
on Assessment (Days) 
Average 
Cosl (Rs.) 
On the Basis of Past Dealing 1 14 
Assess Through other Activities 3 27 
Through Personal Guarantee 4 28 
Inquiring in Applicant Village 5 107 
Visiting the Applicants Place of Work 4 6 
Testing him by giving a Small Initial Loan 2 10 
Personal Relations 0 -
No Screening 0 -
Total 1 18 
Scninc: 1996 Survey of Informal Lenders. 
Appendix Table AI I 
Distribution of Loans Obtained from Non-institutional Sources by 
Size of Farm, Pakistan 1973 and IV88 
Average Amount (Rs) 
Si/.e (Acres) 1973 1988 
0 - 5 1 197 6807 
5 - 1 5 1252 6822 
15-25 1557 9735 
25-50 2169 15772 
>50 4235 8222 
All Sizes 1477 8222 
Gini Coefficient 0.589 0.507 
Sources: Qureshi and Shah (1992). 
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APPENDIX B 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE 
OF INFORMAL LENDERS 
The background characteristics of informal lenders may reflect their abilities 
to generate the required resources for lending business. They may also define the 
context in which recovery of loans is ensured. Some demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of informal lenders are discussed below. 
Age of Informal Lenders at the Time of Survey 
Forty percent of informal lenders were concentrated in relatively older age 
group, 45+ (Appendix Table B1). About one-third of them were less than 35 years 
old at the time when the survey was conducted. Another one-quarter of the lenders 
were in age group of 35-45. Age distribution of the lenders did not change much 
when controlled by their types, though owners of the processing units and 
commission agents were older than other types of informal lenders. This pattern of 
age distribution did not even change when the data were controlled for provinces 
and ecological zones (Appendix Tables B2-B7). 
Education 
As compared lo national literacy level, informal lenders had a fairly high 
level of literacy. About 80 percent of Lenders covered in the survey were literate, 
while according to the 1981 Population Census approximately 36 percent of male 
population aged 15 years or older in the country was literate. The higher level of 
literacy among informal lenders could be attributed to their types of business 
activity where a great amount of record keeping may be needed. 
Alter controlling for types of lenders, educational distribution of informal 
lenders slightly changed. Commission agents and input dealers appear to be more 
educated than other types of informal lenders (Appendix Table B 1). The reason for 
this distribution could be that the commission agents and the input dealers usually 
maintain small offices and they use sub-agents to keep contact with their clients. 
The other likely reason is that they have lo deal with the agents designated 
manufacturing companies of fertiliser and pesticides and who arc well educated. 
High level of educational attainment may help them in these dealings. Appendix 
Tables B2 lo B7 show that proportion of informal lenders having matriculation or 
higher level of education was relatively higher in Sindh and non-irrigated areas than 
in other provinces and ecological zones. 
Land Ownership 
Land owned by informal lenders covered in the survey is also included in 
Appendix Tables B1-B7. Land holding may be an important factor in mobilising 
the resources and in recovering the loans. Its use as collateral to obtain loan from 
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formal sources is well established. The data show that informal lenders differ 
widely in land ownership. One-third of lenders covered in the survey did not own 
any land. This percentage decreased to 20 in the case of Punjab, while it increased 
to 56 percent for Sindh province. It is difficult to explain this difference. However, 
one possible explanation could be that Sindhi landlords might not usually engage 
themselves for their livelihood in any activity except land cultivation. This 
ambiguity clears off once land ownership is examined after controlling for types of 
lenders. Tabic B3 shows that in Sindh, the majority of commission agents, input 
dealer and shopkeepers did not have access to land, suggesting that except 
landlords persons involved in lending business in Sindh generally did not own land. 
Probably lliey were based in small towns from where they run their businesses. 
Lending Experience 
Lending experience could be particularly important in reducing the cost, 
screening loan applicants and recovery of loans. Informal lenders in all regions 
have a fair level of work experience of business (Appendix Table B1-B7). More 
than one-third of the informal lenders had more than 10 years experience of this 
business. Processing units and commission agents had the longest experience in all 
provinces and ecological zones. 
With some reservations, it can be claimed that emergence of professional 
moneylenders in Punjab is a new phenomenon (Appendix Table B2). About 50 
percent of professional moneylenders in this province had less than five years 
experience in the lending business. It has been observed during the case studies 
conducted in different parts of Punjab that many professional moneylenders are 
migrants who have returned from the Middle East (See Section 4). Probably 
overseas savings enabled them to lend money to rural needy people against a fixed 
amount of interest rate. However, it is not possible to confirm this link from the 
survey of informal lenders. 
Occupations before the Job of Informal Lending 
Appendix Table B1 shows that about 40 percent of the informal lenders 
covered in the survey had a job before they entered into lending business. This 
proportion was substantially higher among professional moneylenders than among 
other types of lenders. More than one-quarter of informal lenders who had a 
previous job were employed in the service sector. It is likely that the desire to 
become self-employed has pulled them in the lending business. 
In brief, informal lenders covered in the survey were primarily in the middle 
age group and their level of education was fairly high compared with that of the 
nation as a whole. Except informal lenders who were operating in Sindh, vast 
majority of them owned some land. They had a fairly long experience of lending 
business. With all these background characteristics, lenders seem to be in a good 
position not only to generate resources for their business but also to recover timely 
the extended loans. 
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APPENDIX C 
CASE STUDIES 
In \ icw of the several shortcomings of the questionnaire approach as 
discussed earlier (see Section 2), ii was decided to supplement the survey data 
with four case studies. In April. 1997. four teams of researchers, one from the 
PIDE and three from the PERI, were sent to four small towns of Punjab to stay 
there for about three to four days. These researchers, who were familiar with 
the selected areas, were advised to use informal methods to examine in depth 
the social relations and borrowing and lending activities of both the lenders 
and the borrowers. The research teams identified the key lenders and gained 
their confidence. It is important to note that at no time did the researchers 
attempt a precise measure of the size and turnover of these lenders' business. 
Although the observations made in this section are based on very short visits 
to the study areas, they did help in understanding the mechanisms of informal 
credit market. 
The Geographic Setting 
Four case studies were conducted in four small towns of Punjab: 
Samundari and Tandlianwala (district Faisalabad), Kacha Khoh (district 
Multan) and Zahir Pir (district Rahim Yar Khan). The selection of these 
towns was arbitrary, mainly dictated by the availability of researchers. The 
selected localities represent well the irrigated areas of Punjab. Time was the 
main constraint to send teams to non-irrigated areas of Punjab or to other 
provinces, where the structure of credit market could be different from that of 
the study area. 
Samundari and Tandlianwala tehsils are situated in ihe 'mixed cropping 
zone' where maize; cotton, sugarcane and rice arc the major crops, while Kacha 
Khoh and Zahir Pir are in the cotton zone. However, sugarcane and wheat arc also 
the common crops of this zone. Both ihe mixed and cotton zones have well-
established canal system. In the former (mixed), irrigation water is supplied through 
the canals for both seasons - Rcibi and Kharif while the canal water is available only 
for the Rabi season in the case of cotton zone. A network of tubewclls, mainly 
private, provides irrigation water for Kharif season in ihe cotton zone. 
In irrigated areas the financial requirements of farmers to purchase 
agricultural inputs, such as seeds, pesticides and fertiliser, have increased over time. 
This has increased the demand for credit. Influential persons such as landlords 
obtain the loans from formal credit system like Agricultural Developmenl Bank of 
Pakistan (ADBP), situated mainly in tehsil headquarters. But the long and complex 
process of the ADBP seems to have forced many needy farmers to borrow from the 
informal lenders on relatively higher interest rates. 
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Structure and Composition of Informal Market 
The structure of informal credit market differs across different areas, 
primarily depending on the size of the market, type of commodity transacted, 
location and proximity to the processing facilities. 
Samundari, for instance has a good grain market where about 200 
commission agents are presently operating (Appendix Table CI). These agents 
play a vital role in providing credits to local farmers. More than 50 input dealers 
are also working in Samundari. The researchers were also able to identify 8 
professional moneylender operating in this town (Appendix Table CI) . Besides one 
sugar mill, couple of ginning factories are also engaged in lending business. 
Appendix Table C1 
Type and Number of Informal Lenders Identified by Study Areas 
Name of Areas 
Type of the Lenders Samundari Tandlianwala ZahirPir Kacha Khoh 
Commission Agent 200 5 5 20 
Input Dealers 50 20 12 15 
Moneylenders 8 5 3 -
Ginning Factories 3 10 2 18 
Sugar Mills 1 2 - -
Oil Mills - 3 2 10 
Rice Mills 1 5 - -
Poultry Feed Production Units 5 - - -
Samundari provides a good opportunity lo study the mechanism of the non-
institutional credit market, since farmers can obtain loan in cash or kind from the 
lenders situated in the town and they can also sell their outputs. Tandlianwala has a 
relatively small grain market (Appendix Table CI). Only 5 commission agents and 
20 input dealers operate in this town. There is a concentration of processing units in 
Tandlianwala but according to our research team the role of these units in providing 
loans to farmers is very limited. To ensure the supply of the required inputs, they do 
sometimes lend through their agents. In Zahir Pir and Kacha Khoh, informal credit 
market is mainly controlled by input dealers and commission agents. Kacha Khoh 
is situated on the National Highway where several ginning cum oil factories are 
operating. There are only two ginning factories in Zahir Pir. Hye-Sons Sugar Mills 
is situated at a distance of 30 kilometres from this small town. Another sugar mill 
is operating in Sadiqabad and has its depots in the area. Functions of the informal 
lenders by different categories arc discussed below. 
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Input Dealers 
Inpul dealers usually sell pesticides, fertiliser and seeds on cash and credit. 
To know the role of input dealers as lenders, it is important to understand the whole 
business of inputs, particularly pesticides and fertiliser. Presently, more than two 
dozen manufacturing companies are selling their products (pesticides) in the study 
areas. Some of these companies, such as Ciba-Gaigy and Bayer, are multinationals. 
The national companies were also allowed in 1992 to bring their products in the 
market. Most of the manufacturers market pesticides through their well-educated, 
well-paid and trained sales officers, who keep close contacts with local input 
dealers and large farmers. 
For the cotton crop, pesticides are used between the months of June and 
September. However, all pesticide manufacturing companies start booking in 
advance for their products from January. For input dealers (and for farmers), early 
booking means high commission, which varies by manufacturers. Multinationals 
offer 25 percent commission on early booking. This percentage rises to 60 percent 
in the case of some national manufacturers. However, it declines to only 10 percent 
or even less if booking is made during the months of June and September when the 
demand for pesticides is at its peak. The commission is given on the Maximum 
Retail Price (MRP) written on every box or bottle of a pesticide. In addition 
domestic producers also give rebate on total sales, which varies from 2 to 7 percent. 
Input dealers arc usually obliged to pay full amount at the time of booking. 
However, in 1997, some companies made the booking on only 25 percent advance 
payment. Some local companies were willing lo make ihe bookings without any 
advance payment. Sales agents of different companies play a vital role in the size 
of the bookings. They are usually given targets by their respective companies 
hence they have developed close contacts with local growers, input dealers and 
commission agents. 
The question is at what price the booked pesticides are sold to farmers? 
Cash price of different pesticides is usually much lower than the MRP, and several 
additional factors determine it. The pesticides market is not monopolistic in its \ / 
nature; rather it seems to be highly competitive. For cash transactions, inpul dealers 
give up a major part of their commissions (Appendix Table C2) in the hope of 
getting some 'rebate' from the respective companies. Some time they sell pesticides 
without any profit, in other words, they pass on all the commission to the cash 
buyer. Time is also an important factor in determining the cash prices of pesticides. 
During the months of January and May, when the use of pcsticidcs is limited lo 
vegetables and orchards, input dealers sell them on a very low profit. 
Credit prices of pesticides differ widely from the cash priccs. For sale on 
credit, input dealers not only receive the full MRP of a peslicidc but sometimes 
lliey also chargc more than the MRP, particularly on the products of multinational 
companies, such as Ciba-Gaigy and Bayrc, which give relatively low commissions. 
However, it is common among input dealers lo sell on credit those pesticides, 

which give them high rate of commission. Therefore input dealers' mark-up on 
pesticides depends on the nature of product being sold and also on the status of 
association between the borrower and the dealer. It is highly likely that price of an 
input sold on credit varies substantially among borrowers. 
The question is why does commission vary substantially across the different 
pesticides? One possibility is that the quality til those pesticides that are beins sold 
on 60 percent or more commission is very low. According to some key informants, 
pesticides sold on a high commission contain only half of the recommended dose. 
It means low quality pesticides are currently being sold on credit to farmers on very 
high prices, which entails exploitative rates of mark-up. 
The case of fertiliser is different from the pesticides. Any dealer can arrange 
booking for the required quantity of fertiliser by sending full payment through a 
bank draft to the nearest fertiliser manufacturer. The dealers arc eligible to receive 
only eight rupees per bag as their commission. Generally this commission is the 
only profit, if they sell it on cash. However, if they sell it on credit, they charge an 
extra one hundred rupees on each bag of fertiliser. The current market (cash) price 
of a bag of fertiliser (urea) is 350 rupees, thereby yielding a 29 percent mark-up rate 
for the dealers selling on credit. 
Some input dealers also sell seeds and oil cakes, particularly in Samundari 
and Tandlianwala. These inputs are usually sold in cash. In the case of sale on 
credit, not only is the duration of loan very short, one to two months only, but also 
the mark-up is quite high, 10 to 20 percent for this short duration. 
Inpul dealers generally extend credit without any collateral or written 
agreement. Recovery of loans is usually smooth. Farmers, because of both their 
close contacts with the dealers and in view of their future needs for credit, tend to 
return the money borrowed well in time. However, in the case of crop failure, 
which has been the case in Zahir Pir area over the last three years, recovery of full 
loan was very difficult. Unlike moneylenders who charge compound interest rale 
after the due date, input dealers usually wait for the next crop for recovery of their 
loans without increasing their interest. 
It appears that in general input dealers are meeting effectively ihe needs of 
local farmers. However, their mark-up on some pesticides such as Methomidophos 
and Cypermetharin (Appendix Table C2) is very high, mainly because of ihe high-
commission policy of their manufacturers. To the extent this high rate of 
commission facilitates the sale of sub-standard pesticides it should constitute a 
source of concern. Some quality control on these types of pesticides can reduce 
this high mark-up. 
Commission Agents 
In Pakistan grain markets are generally situated at the tehsil headquarters, 
although some small towns also have well-established markets. As noted earlier, in 
the areas covered by the present study, only Samundari has good grain market 
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where aboul 200 commission agents operate (Appendix Table CI) . Observations 
made below arc mainly based on the functions of the commission agents located in 
this town. 
Commission agents generally do not sell inputs directly to farmers. 
However, they do meet the requirements of their customers indirectly, through the 
local input dealers. A very close link between the commission agents and input 
dealers has developed in Samundari. The former asks input dealers to provide the 
required inputs to their customers, wherein the money is paid within one week. 
This payment is made on the basis of prevailing cash prices of the inputs sold. 
However, the commission agents charge their customers the MRP, so, they earn a 
mark-up on supply of inputs similar to that being earned by input dealers. 
Farmers who buy inputs on credit from commission agents are generally 
bound to sell their outputs through them on a fixed commission, usually one 
percent. The profit of commission agents can be further increased if they buy 
outputs from the farmers whom they extend loans. It is also not uncommon among 
the local commission agents lo lend money to farmers without interest on the surety 
that the borrowers will sell outputs to them. 
An indirect link was also found between the members of local co-operative 
societies and the commission agents. The co-operative societies give loans to their 
members on 13 percent annual interest. If it is not possible for a member to return 
his loan and the amount of interest on due date, he contacts a commission agent for 
payment. The commission agent receives a profit equal to 5 percent of the total 
payment. Within a day or two, the member reobtains the loan and returns the actual 
amount in addition to 5 percent to the commission agent, both. 
Commission agents, who sometimes provide short-term loans without 
interest to facilitate farmers to buy fertiliser and pesticides, also control vegetable 
markets. According to key informants, high rate of commission, 7 lo 9 percent, 
prevailing in the vegetable markets is the main reason for this interest-free lending 
practice. An interesting network has been developed between the tomato-growers 
in the surrounding areas of Zahir Pir (district Rahim Yar Khan) and commission 
agents situated in Karachi fruit and vegetable market. In these areas, production of 
tomato exceeds the local demand; therefore, the growers sell their produce in 
Karachi. Some farmers obtain small interest-free loans for short duration from the 
commission agents, through their local sub-agents. 
Moneylenders 
Lending money on interest is not a very old phenomenon in Punjab. 
Moneylenders who have currently been lending money started their businesses 
during the last 8 to 10 years. Ii is difficult to know precisely how and why did they 
enter in the business of lending. But it seems that occasional failure of cotton crops 
during the last decade was the main reason for their entry. The crop failure not only 
limits the capacity of farmers to return their loans but it also hinders traditional 
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lenders, such as commission agents, to extend loans to farmers. This gap was filled 
by individuals who had some savings to be loaned. Some of these individuals had a 
chance to work in the Middle East. Moneylenders charge high interest rates, w hich 
may have enabled them to accumulate these savings in a short period of time. 
Moreover, the role of moneylenders has diversified over time. In the study 
areas, they lend money to farmers, commission agents, input dealers and livestock 
dealers. Duration of loans and rate of interest vary across the types of borrowers. Ii 
is useful to discuss these variations in detail. 
Moneylenders and Farmers 
The research team in Zahir Pir was able to identify five moneylenders 
operating in the town and its surrounding rural areas. These lenders usually lend 
money to farmers through a mediator - the local councillor or landlord. Annual 
interest rate charged by these lenders varies between 40 and 50 percent. In 1996 
only one moneylender distributed a loan of Rs 2.5 million in one village on 50 
percent annual interest. One-fourth of this amount was loaned to the mediator's 
elder brother. To ensure the recovery of loan, a written agreement was also signed 
between the two parties, and witnesses were selected by ihe lenders. Rate of 
interest or the amount of total interest was not shown in the agreement separately. 
Rather it was considered as part of the capital amount. For example, if a farmer has 
borrowed 100,000 rupees on 40 percent interest rate, he was required to sign on a 
legal document showing that he has received 140,000 rupees as simple loan without 
any interest rate to be paid (Qarz-i-Hasna). This enables the moneylender to use 
legal apparatus to recover the amount specified in the agreement. 
One moneylender has recently introduced a new collateral system through 
which he gets a written statement from the farmer who borrows money that he has 
sold a fixed piece of land against the amount borrowed. Because of these terms and 
conditions, this moneylender was able it) get two acres of agricultural land in 1996 
from one of his defaulters. For loan adjustment, the same moneylender took in his 
possession a tractor of a farmer. Two other farmers sold their lands to return the 
loan. Three consecutive crop (cotton) failures have limited the capacity of local 
farmers to return their loans; therefore they were forced lo sell their property for 
loan adjustment. 
In rural areas surrounding Samundari and Tandlianwala, moneylenders 
operate in a different way. They lend relatively small amounts of money on 10 lo 
13 percent monthly interest rate (Appendix Table C3). Small farmers or landless 
households usually take these high-interest loans for their consumption needs or 
health care. Duration of loan is very short and jewellery is the common form of 
collateral. Amount of interest is paid monthly to lenders. Delay in payment gives 
the lenders opportunity to demand for return of total loan. This recovery is 
sometimes made by selling the jewellery taken as collateral or by collecting farm 
animals from the borrowers. 
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Appendix Table C-3 
Transaction of Five Moneylenders in Samundari Tehsil 
Moneylender 
Total Experience 
of Lending 
Business (Years) 
Amount 
Loaned (Rs) 
Monthly Interest 
Rate ( percent) 
Number of 
Borrower 
Main Purpose of 
Loan 
1 15 150,000 10 10 Livestock purchase 
2 5 45,000 10 3 Consumption 
3 4 115,000 13 8 Health/livestock 
4 12 350,(X)0 4 2 Business 
5 2 35,000 10 - Consumption 
Moneylenders and Commission Agents/Input Dealer 
It was noted in the beginning of this section that in the four study areas, only 
Samundari has a good grain market where about 200 commission agents operate 
(Appendix Table CI) . The research team designated in this area was able to 
identify a link between the local commission agents and moneylenders. Eight 
moneylenders operating in the town lend money only to local commission agents. 
The amount of loan is usually more than 100,000 rupees and interest rate is 4 
percent per month. Commission agents who obtain loan from moneylenders are 
required to pay the amount of interest monthly. The regular payment of interest 
refrains lenders to demand for the principle amount. However, because of the high 
;nla!re>U Ttttc, h«w»wu-,s. Commission. agents) usually return loan within three 
months. It is still unclear that what proportion of local commission agents borrow 
from moneylenders and, more importantly, why do they borrow on such high 
interest rate? 
As noted earlier, under the prevailing system, input dealers need large 
amounts of money to make early bookings of pesticides, and moneylenders can be 
one of their sources of funds. In all areas covered by the present study, 
moneylenders do provide money to some input dealers for 6 to 7 months on 18 to 
20 percent interest. 
Moneylenders and Livestock Dealers 
Moneylenders seem to be the major source of funds for livestock dealers 
who operate in the local markets (mandis) which are organised regularly in 
Samundari, Tandlianwala and several other places surrounding these towns. 
Livestock dealers borrow money from the local moneylenders on 4 percent 
monthly interest. Like commission agents, they are also required to pay the amount 
of interest every month. However, research teams did not have enough time to 
explore the details of this business. There is a need to carry out a study to work out 
the role of the moneylenders in the livestock business. 
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Processing Units 
Cotton ginning factories, sugar mills, oil mills, rice mills and poultry feed 
production units are located in the different study areas. It was observed during the 
case studies that processing units have a very little direct role in informal financial 
market. There is a possibility that these units are involved in'the lending business 
but the research team could not identify their role because of both their short 
duration of stay in the study areas and their focus on other informal lenders such as 
input dealers, commission agents and moneylenders. 
Cotton-growers who take loans from factories sell them their outputs. The 
outputs are sold directly or through agents who receive a fixed commission from 
both the factories and the growers. Because of the supply of cotton, loan 
adjustment is easier for factories than for input dealers or moneylenders. However, 
growers who are bound to sell their outputs to factories are sometimes at a 
disadvantage, factory rate could be lower than the market rale. It happens when 
cotton production in some districts is lower than the demand of local cotton 
factories. 
In Samundari poultry feed production units sell their produce on credit for 
35 lo 40 days. The mark-up for this period is about 4 percent. To ensure the 
recovery of loans, the production units are sometimes involved in the sale of birds 
(chicken). According to key informants, sugar mills used to provide loans to 
sugarcane growers in the mill area. In the wake of increased competition among 
the sugar mills to buy sugarcane at long distances, recovery of loans became 
problematic so the sugar mills stopped loaning to growers. 
Despite the short time period the researchers were able lo collect valuable 
information that would not have been available otherwise. Moneylenders have dual 
role in informal financial market: they lend money directly to farmers and livestock 
dealers and they are also a source of funds for other informal lenders, such as 
commission agents and inpul dealers. Their interest rate is well beyond 40 percent 
per annum. On small amounts, the monthly interest rate is about 10 percent. We 
arc not in a position to claim that the role of moneylenders has been investigated 
comprehensively. Rather through these observations we have been able lo show 
the importance of moneylenders in ihe non-institutional financial market. Furlhcr 
investigation will definitely enhance our understanding. 
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ABSTRACT 
This study has examined the structure of informal credit market in Pakistan 
hy combining two approaches; a field survey administering semi-structured 
questionnaire to more than 1000 informal lenders supplemented by case studies. 
According to the survey, a good deal of interlinkages exists between formal and 
informal credit institutions. However, informal credit system draws readily on 
additional sources including friends and moneylenders. Informal credit market can 
be characterized as competitive. If a monopolistic situation prevails in the market it 
is because of peculiar relationship between lender and borrower, such as landlord 
vs. tenant. It appears from the survey that like the formal financial market, lenders 
in the informal markets also follow credit worthiness as the major criteria to lend. 
This reduces considerably the levels of funds allocated to less privileged and 
assetless. 
Mark-up tends to vary from product lo product and also by type of borrower 
as well as lender. On the average, the mark-up is estimated to be 25 percent. In the 
case of fertilizer it is 29 percenl while for the pesticides it comes around 35 percent. 
High mark-up charged on the pesticides sold on credit is mostly due to rather 
unholy alliance between the manufacturers and traders/dealers. The case studies 
suggest that pure money lending is on the rise with quite exploitative interest rates 
ranging from 48 perccnt to 120 percent per year. Failure of cotton crop for the last 
three years, and increasing requirements of farmers for inputs partly explain this 
rise. The high rate of interest can also be attributed to illegal nature of the business. 
Legal registration of this business is likely to bring down the interest rate. If this is 
not politically feasible then there is a real need to introduce some sort of crop 
insurance scheme as well as innovative credit schemes such as group based lending. 
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